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Panel II: Controlling Imports and
Opening Foreign Markets
PROFESSOR HAROLD KOH: Our second panel begins with Gary
Horlick, a graduate of Dartmouth, Cambridge University, and this law school.
He worked at the Ford Foundation in Latin America, and then in private
practice before becoming international trade counsel to the Senate Finance
Committee. He then served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Im-
port Administration, and is currently a partner at the law firm of O'Melveny
and Myers in Washington, D.C. Mr. Horlick lectures on International Trade
at Georgetown Law Center. He taught the international trade course at Yale
Law School for several years and played an integral part in developing interest
in international trade here. He is also the world's greatest fanatic about Pepe's
pizza.
MR. GARY HORLICK: One point worth emphasizing at the out-
set is the interplay between the procedural aspects you heard about
earlier this morning and the substance in any given case. A good
example is the discussion ofjudicial review you had at the end of the
first session. Judicial review was absolutely crucial at the Depart-
ment of Commerce in forcing us to do the job right. Whether every
case got reviewed did not matter; what mattered was the knowledge
that it could be reviewed. This became, first, a pressure to do the
case right, and second, an explanation to give to members of Con-
gress, cabinet secretaries, or foreign ambassadors, about why a case
couldn't be fixed. They'd say, "Do it this way, it's politically conve-
nient." And you'd say, "We'd be sued. It wouldn't work." That's a
very good example of how procedural devices-in this case, judicial
review-force adherence to substantive norms.
What I want to do today is not give you a rather dry recital of the
U.S. trade statutes. What I want to do is take a look at the way these
laws are currently being viewed by Congress. As you may have no-
ticed, trade is a hot item legislatively this year, and the proposed
changes deal with almost every section of the U.S. trade laws. By
way of background, as you may have gathered from this morning's
panel, U.S. trade policy is mainly reactive. It is a function of private
pressures on the government; the government rarely takes the initi-
ative. That has changed slightly in what I label as the "post-Bello
era," starting in 1985, when the U.S. government for the first time
since at least 1981 started trying to think coherently about what the
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U.S. wanted as a trade policy. But even so, most trade proceedings,
most trade pressures, and most lobbying are still a result of private
company pressures.
You can identify two forms of pressures. One form deals with
imports. Import relief pressures, to put it very simply, are applied
by private entities, such as companies and workers, trying to use the
trade laws to exclude competition. They are explicitly anti-competi-
tive, as Harvey Applebaum stated this morning. Harvey's back-
ground is ideal for this practice. It takes an antitrust lawyer to
recognize just how anticompetitive these laws are. In that sense, I
agree with Peter Ehrenhaft's thought that in theory they really ought
to be privatized. Private companies are trying to use a body of law
to reduce competition. The same companies would do the same to
their domestic competitors if they could. There is no reason why
eliminating competition should be accomplished through adminis-
trative agencies in the government.
There's an important corollary which Peter added that many
others don't: We have to have the right standard. It's not enough
simply to say you need a private right of action. We have to figure
out what the standards should be. Where import relief is con-
cerned, whether it's through the antidumping or countervailing
duty laws in particular, or through any other law, a series of ques-
tions exists. The first question-and it is fundamental-is: What
justification is there for treating foreign goods differently from U.S.
goods? A perfect example is as follows: A company in the U.S. can
sell at a certain price related to its costs and be considered to be
acting not only fairly but nobly. Our whole economic system is
based upon price competition. We encourage our companies to
lower their prices. But if the same company were just outside the
U.S. and shipping the good in with the same cost structure and
prices, it would be dumping. We have to ask why, and indeed if,
there is any justification for considering one good to be unfair and
the other fair. That, indeed, is the real flaw in the stirring oration
my good friend Mike Stein gave to you about semiconductors and
lumber. You can only say that this is in the world economic interest
in terms of allocation and resources if the standards being used are
economically efficient. Certainly the antidumping law is a joke in
terms of economic efficiency. I say that, having enforced it rigor-
ously for two years because it's on the books. But it doesn't make
sense, at least to most economists, in terms of the kinds of pricing
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schemes they want and very noticeably it is not followed within the
U.S. in U.S. antitrust law.
The second question-and it is related to the first-is: What is
fair behavior? Some criteria other than economic efficiency may ex-
ist, though again, as a policy matter, why is it fair if the U.S. does it
and unfair if a foreigner does it, or vice versa? No one in Congress
is looking at these questions. The assumption is that dumping is evil
and pernicious.
The second congressional focus is on market opening measures.
This concern is embodied Section 301, which provides for a sweep-
ing delegation of power to the President. The breadth of this dele-
gation is really quite remarkable compared to that found in
domestic regulation. Section 301 in essence allows the President to
do anything he wants to any imported good or service, with no judi-
cial review and no good standards to speak of. Even if there were
standards, in view of the importance of judicial review in maintain-
ing standards, without such review the President could do anything
he wanted to do. I can think of no economic regulatory area in a
domestic context where Congress has given such sweeping power to
the President, outside of time of war. Under it, the President can
use access to the U.S. market as leverage to force foreign markets
open. And this of course is desirable; it is pro-competitive. What
we're trying to do, in a bizarre way, is to force the Japanese to open
their markets. In theory, that would make them even more competi-
tive economically because, presumably, if they're protecting their
home markets, their import prices are higher than they should be
and they're paying for that. So, these market opening measures are
a good thing from a world economic policy point of view.
The caveat is whether, first of all, this is accomplished in a way
that actually does open foreign markets or whether it's really being
done to set up a pretext for closing the U.S. market, i.e., the U.S.
finds that the market in Ruritania is closed to U.S. widgets; there-
fore, the U.S. closes down access to its market for Ruritanian wid-
gets. Maybe the goal of the widget industry all along was simply to
close out Ruritanian widgets but it couldn't figure out a way.
The third question, which is more tortured, is: What can be
gained in international negotiations? As I say, we want to use our
market as leverage, and that's a rational approach. But what can we
"get" using that leverage? In most bargaining situations, one party
doesn't have complete power; the other side has some-pardon the
term-countervailing power. It becomes very tricky to guess how
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far the U.S. can go, how much it can get foreign countries to open
their markets before instead they start closing their markets and
trigger counter-retaliation. The reason I stress this second aspect is
that this is the congressional conundrum that you're seeing this year
reflected in the Gephardt Amendment, the Super 301, the 301, and
so on. The question is: How can Congress force the Administration
to make what is in essence an extremely subtle judgment? The prin-
cipal congressional sponsors of these measures have been quite
aware of this problem. I remember talking to a staffer in 1982 when
this discussion was launched. As she put it, "Congress cannot legis-
late subtlety." Anything Congress does is going to be a blunt in-
strument. In 1985, the Administration finally started taking the
retaliatory/negotiation approach to the situation. The problem was,
however, that it was too late for Congress. What you see now in
legislation is Congress trying to control the Administration by set-
ting standards that define exactly how the Administration should tell
when it has pushed just the right amount in negotiations. If any of
you have ever been in any kind of negotiations, starting with buying
a car, you will realize that it's very hard to negotiate by remote con-
trol through a body of 537 members.
Briefly, let me go over the provisions of the legislation and then
you'll hear some comments, I'm sure, from other panelists. The
stated purposes of the trade legislation in 1987 are threefold, all of
them quite noble. The first concerns the Uruguay Round. It is to
provide the U.S. government with the authority to negotiate trade
agreements that would open foreign markets to us and open our
market further to foreigners, in the name of increased economic effi-
ciency. Such matters often boil down to fights between Congress
and the Executive about the proper allocation of power. While this
is a life and death matter for my fellow panelist today, Judy Bello,
and her colleagues in the executive branch, involving the formula-
tion of trade policy, it really goes more to the allocation of power
under the U.S. Constitution than to trade policy as such.
The second stated purpose of the 1987 trade legislation involves
Section 201, or the "escape clause," and concerns the issue of ad-
justment. There's a legitimate concern within Congress that the
U.S. really does not have a good system for channeling energies to-
ward adjustment rather than toward protection. Both the Ways and
Means and Finance Committees have worked very hard and very
responsibly. (That isn't to say I agree with all they've done.) Essen-
tially, what they're trying to do is to force the International Trade
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Commission to decide if an industry seeking import relief under
Section 201 can become competitive, or whether it should simply
slowly fold its tents and adjust out of the industry. This promises to
put a real burden on the ITC. I can't think of a U.S. government
agency that indulges in that kind ofjudgment,' and the only conso-
lation I have for the judges on the Court of International Trade is
that their decisions will not be subject to judicial review.
This is the kind of thing investment bankers do all the time.
What's fascinating is that the government is going to try to substi-
tute its judgment for that of the marketplace, and that this is being
done in the name of a free market and a level playing field. I don't
know how it will work out, but this is a fairly sincere attempt by the
two committees.
There is an interesting problem with Section 201, which hasn't
been mentioned. If you're serious about using Section 201 in a way
that is beneficial for the world trading system, it's not one-sided. If
one vote had switched on the ITC, the U.S. in 1980 could have
raised very high tariffs on Japanese autos. And it wouldn't just have
been Japanese autos, but everyone's automobiles. The U.S. imports
about $20 billion in autos a year. In theory, under the GATT, if a
10% tariff were set on $20 billion in automobiles, tariffs would be
lowered 10% on $20 billion in other imports, and if that's the case,
it becomes a way offighting protectionism. If you're going to protect
your auto industry, you're forced to lower levels of protection in
your other industries to keep a balance.
One of the main reasons we do not use Section 201 more, and
instead use bilateral voluntary restraint agreements, is to avoid pay-
ing that kind of tariff "compensation," to increase our overall level
of protection. Again, most economists would say that is corrosive,
rather than beneficial, to the world trading system. If we don't
lower our tariffs 10% on $20 billion worth of goods, all the foreign
countries get to retaliate against $20 billion of our exports by rais-
ing their tariffs 10%. Thus the shakes and shingles case, which was
mentioned earlier, was a victory for the shakes and shingles industry
here. It didn't matter much except to certain book publishers, com-
1. I recall that this same type of 'judgment call" came up in the context of counter-
vailing duty cases in 1982 on European steel. The question under the subsidy law was
whether or not a government investment in a foreign industry was viable. We had the
statutory deadlines you heard about; actually less, 150 days. We called up some major
consulting firms and asked if they could help us, how much it would cost, and how long
it would take. They came back with "two years" and "$5,000,000," neither of which we
had.
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puter parts makers and Christmas tree growers in the U.S. who
found Canada slapping tariffs on their exports to Canada in retalia-
tion. Import relief was granted in 1983 on specialty steel and the
Canadians retaliated on U.S. specialty steel exports. We don't sell a
lot of specialty steel in Europe, so instead of retaliating on specialty
steel, the Europeans did a laundry list. They retaliated on chemicals,
skis, and either firearms or fire alarms (I've never gotten it straight).
It turned out that one company, a name that used to be quite famil-
iar in New Haven, Olin, sold all three in Europe. They had no idea
this retaliation was coming at them. They woke up and found three
of their lines of business suddenly subjected to protectionist Euro-
pean tariffs because of the U.S. desire to protect its specialty steel
industry, an industry with which Olin had no connection, except
that it turned out that Olin bought European specialty steel for the
edges for its skis. A company totally uninvolved in the case found
itself disadvantaged in four different ways.
This leads into the big question, the big fight on Section 201 in
the current legislation, which is presidential discretion in Section
201. The argument for presidential discretion is specifically to look
out for the Olins of the world, or the farmers, or the consumers.
Section 201 is not a free ride. Yes, we could protect ourselves
against Japanese cars and European cars, but we would pay for it in
other ways. Someone's going to pay for it, and the real lesson of
most trade policies is that there's no free lunch. That's why people
fight so hard in Washington. Protectionism is a form of rent-seeking
behavior and frequently, for many industries, the highest return on
their investment is Washington lawyers. If a lawyer could get im-
port relief 'worth $100 million, the legal fees would have to be astro-
nomical for that to be a lower return on investment than an ordinary
factory's 10% or 15% annual return.
The last of the three main goals of the 1987 legislation addresses
the use of access to the U.S. market as leverage to get access over-
seas. As I said, this is something the U.S. is very interested in and is
positive on the trade side. The legislative issue is presidential dis-
cretion. This issue is probably the toughest single fight. Assuming
that the U.S. has a good definition of what constitutes unfair trading
practices by foreigners, should the President be required to retaliate
against those unfair practices in other markets? This leads into the
problem of how Congress can set up in advance a standard for ne-
gotiation. This is very tricky. Most of the serious fighting in Con-
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gress about trade this year is over how much presidential discretion
there should be in Section 301.
Those are the three stated goals of the legislation. But the deadly
parts of the bill for trade lawyers are the dumping and counter-
vailing duty provisions. Why do we care about dumping or counter-
vailing duty provisions? It goes back to the discussion about the
privatization of trade law in the U.S. Dumping and countervailing
duty rules are non-discretionary-if your case is good, you win.
Therefore, lawyers almost always prefer to use them because there's
no risk of losing out to political influence at the White House. Cer-
tainly in my two years I can honestly say that none of our cases was
decided politically. Since those laws are non-discretionary, there's
an obvious pressure put on the legislature by any domestic company
with any kind of trade problem to define that trade problem as
either dumping or subsidies. You'd much rather have your problem
defined as dumping than as something that's actionable under Sec-
tion 201, because Section 201 has the political review and concern
for consumers that you've heard about. If you can get Congress to
define your problem as dumping, then Commerce calculates the
duty, the ITC finds injury, and you've won your case. Consumers
don't enter into it, nor does competitive policy.
I will give a couple of examples to show how the legislative pro-
cess works. First, a case involving Canadian pork. Congress passed
a law in 1984 setting out the means of defining an "input" subsidy.
The Commerce Department decided to ignore that law in 1985. A
foreigner went to court; the court ruled in the foreigner's favor.
The U.S. pork industry didn't like it; it went to Congress, and so far
has already gotten the Senate to reverse the court. That's not an
issue of policy; it's simply a matter of having the industry's problem
defined as a subsidy or dumping. On the dumping side, similarly,
there's an amendment introduced by one Senator for the stated pur-
pose of raising duties on Japan by 20%. The other argument in
favor of it is that the European Community does it to us; therefore,
we should do it to Japan. Actually, the EC doesn't do it to us; that's
a misstatement. The funny part of all this is that the Japanese, who
have enough problems with the U.S., never use their dumping law
against us.
What does this all mean in the big picture? The big picture is
simple. What I have described is the nightmare you heard about at
the end of the last session. Is the revolution coming? It's already
here. It's happening piecemeal. You see the same sort of adminis-
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trative protection being put in every trade act, and it's layered. You
start in 1974 with some layers, 1979 with some more layers, 1984
more, 1987 yet more. This is fine; it means more U.S. industries will
get relief and more workers will be employed in the U.S. But, if
everyone does it, it becomes self-defeating. A short history of U.S.
trade policy is as follows: Until 1934, Congress did all trade policy
by line item tariffs. That worked until other countries raised their
tariffs to retaliate against ours. The net result was that world trade
dropped by approximately one-half; that drop is usually considered
one of the causes of the worldwide depression. Whether that's true
or not, everyone believes it. So, starting in 1934, the U.S. led the
world toward market opening, getting rid of protection. Now the
protection is happening piecemeal, and the U.S. and every foreign
country, each in its own way, is heading in the wrong direction.
We're doing it, not through tariffs, but through a proliferation of
trade bills. This is an extremely gloomy outlook. I had thought
about this and had decided to leave you in a depressed state about
it. The only ray of light I have is that the person following me is the
fairy godmother of U.S. trade law, my former classmate here, co-
counsel, colleague and a few other things, and the ray of hope in
U.S. trade law, Judy Bello.
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Panel II: Respondents
PROFESSOR KOH: If I can just embellish the description ofJudy Bello:
She's a graduate of this law school who went on to work at the Legal Adviser's
office at the State Department, then, after a stint in private practice, was the
Deputy for Public Policy, for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Import Administration, who at least part of that time was Gay Horlick. She is
now the Deputy General Counsel at the United States Trade Representative's
office, 2 where she is the chair of the Section 301 committee. So, very frequently
when we're talking about what the President can do under Section 301, we're
talking about what Judy and her committee are recommending that he do.
She's also been a lecturer in trade law here at Yale, and has been integral in the
continuing interest in the subject here.
MS. JUDITH HIPPLER BELLO: I reckoned that Gary was going
to leave you in a gloomy state, and I knew that he would shift to me
the role of being Pollyanna. So I'm going to try to fulfill that
expectation.
This responsibility, though, reminds me-as it may some of you-
of what White House staffers tell me is the President's favorite joke,
bar none. And that is of the little boy who on Christmas morning
runs down the stairs with his parents close behind him to see what
Santa has brought him from Toys 'R' Us. He's expecting trains,
mechanical toys, laser guns, and so forth. Instead, to everyone's
horror, they find a room full of manure. The parents are stunned;
the little boy is aghast, and stops dead in his tracks. He then recov-
ers, disappears for a moment, comes back with a shovel, and franti-
cally begins shoveling this manure. His father, who still hasn't
recovered from the shock of what happened to everything he
bought at Toys 'R' Us, says, "Son, what are you doing?" The boy
replies, "Dad, with all this manure, there must be a pony in here
somewhere!"
Gary Horlick hasn't given you all the details, but there are many
of us in the executive branch who see each of the bills passed in the
House and Senate as approximately 1200 pages each of a lot of
manure. A reasonable question, then, is why are we cooperating
with the Congress in trying to shape a reasonable trade bill? Is it
only that we believe in miracles on 34th Street, or is there some
2. Ms. Bello was named Acting General Counsel at the USTR in Novermber 1987.
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rational basis--other than our enormous faith in Thelma Askey3 and
Josh Bolten?4 With them at the helm, if only they were in the major-
ity position, everything would be O.K. Otherwise, what is the basis
of our continuing to try to work with the Congress to get a bill that
we at least can live with and, we hope, even like?
There is a pony in the trade bills, and it's worth trying to extricate
him from the barnyard in which he's been entombed. The pony, as
most of you probably know, is what's referred to as negotiating au-
thority. That is not, of course, what it really is. As you all know
from Constitutional Law I, the President, under the Constitution,
already has plenary authority to negotiate under his foreign affairs
powers. But as you also know from Constitutional Law I, it's the
Congress that has constitutional authority over foreign commerce.
While we can negotiate with our trading partners until we're blue in
the face, they realize we can't "deliver" unless we have the Congress
on board in those negotiations.
What's been worked out by some of my august predecessors is
what's called the "fast track." That is, the Congress agrees in ad-
vance that when we bring back to the Congress an agreement that
we've negotiated and an implementing bill, the Congress will con-
sider them under the so-called "fast track." It does not guarantee
that Congress will approve the agreement and change U.S. law in
the way that appropriate implementation of the agreement will re-
quire. But it does guarantee up front that the Congress will con-
sider a trade agreement on an expedited timetable, and that at the
end of the day (usually 60 days), it will vote "yes" or "no" on the
entire package, which will not be subject to hopelessly unraveling
amendments.
Most of us view the fast track as a real "pony" in the trade area.
The reason is that, as I think Professor Koh mentioned this morn-
ing, just last year we launched the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations. This is the eighth round of trade negotiations,
the most ambitious ever in scope. Now, is this just another round of
trade negotiations or is this truly critical? I'd like to argue that it's
truly critical. The reason is that we are faced with these 1200-page
trade bills, principally because of Congress' frustration with our
mounting trade deficit. But everyone in Washington, even in the
hallowed halls of Congress, agrees that the causes of the trade defi-
cit are not problems with trade policy or trade laws that can be
3. See Participants' Biographies at vii.
4. See Participants' Biographies at viii.
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tinkered with. Instead, a chief cause of our trade deficit is our inade-
quate savings rate, fueled in turn principally by our federal budget
deficit. Another cause is closed access to markets abroad-in lesser
developed countries, because of their debt problems and lack of
money to buy things from us, and in developed countries like Ger-
many and Japan, because they have deliberately chosen to have slow
growth policies. So the markets are closed abroad, we don't save
enough here, our economic engines are being fueled by foreign in-
vestment in the United States, and the result necessarily is what
seems to be a chronic trade imbalance. That is what's driving the
trade bills, but the trade bills will do nothing to fix any of those
problems.
What will help fix some of those problems is the Uruguay Round
of multilateral trade negotiations, where we're trying to improve the
current GATT rules. For example, we are trying to improve the
rules on dispute settlement because, after all, substantive rules are
less valuable if you can't count on getting your disputes under them
resolved expeditiously. We are also targeting the rules for agricul-
ture, which had long been the source of too often acrimonious dis-
putes with our trading partners-in particular, the European
Community.
We are also trying to expand the trading rules greatly; they cur-
rently cover only merchandise trade. Merchandise trade increas-
ingly accounts for less and less of world trade. So we want to cover
trade in services, intellectual property issues, and also trade-related
investment measures. We want to make the world trading system
more comprehensive and reliable so that it can continue to be as
open and as fair as possible. So, the great hope here for the
problems that have given rise to the trade deficit and thus to the
frustration that the Congress is trying to cope with, is that they can
be resolved by these negotiations.
But we will not make progress in these negotiations unless we can
tell our trading partners that they are not wasting their time talking
to the President and his staff only. Instead, we want to be able to
say, "Not to worry; we have authority from our Congress. Chances
are good that the Congress will 'deliver' when we bring back an
agreement. Therefore, it makes sense for you to talk with us."
We met with a group of commercial counselors from several em-
bassies recently and asked them, "What are you going to recom-
mend to your governments if we don't get a trade bill in 1987, either
because the Congress doesn't deliver, or the President vetoes?"
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And their answer was, "We're going to tell our governments to stop
negotiating. Otherwise you guys get two bites at the apple. First,
they negotiate with the President. Then the Congress takes a hard,
critical look and they negotiate with the Congress. That's unfair."
So that's what I argue in the first instance is a valuable "pony," so
valuable that we continue to work with the Congress even though
what we'd really like to do is throw out most of the pending omni-
bus trade bill provisions.
At the same time, though, to be honest, I note that this pony is a
little bit hobbled to start with. The fast track is a peculiar entity in
U.S. trade law. It is a statute, enshrined in the United States Code.
However, when you read it closely, it clearly was enacted as part of
the constitutional rulemaking procedures in each of the houses of
Congress. What that means is that even if the Congress enacts and
the President signs a trade bill in 1987, the House and the Senate
each has plenary authority in accordance with its rules to change the
fast-track. We might think we're getting fast-track authority, but it
could be modified at any time.
This was underscored to me and others quite recently-in fact,
Wednesday-in the context of the Canadian negotiations (which we
were hotly pursuing until Canada walked out on us earlier this
week). As you may know, we have a very powerful maritime lobby in
the United States. The industry is very happy with the protection it
enjoys in the form of the Jones Act 5 and other current laws. Conse-
quently, it does not want maritime issues to be on the negotiations
table. So the industry approached the Senate Rules Committee to
change the rules in the Senate to take fast track off the table for any
trade agreement with Canada that encompasses maritime
negotiations.
I don't think this Senate resolution is likely to be passed; that's
not my concern. My concern is that this development symbolizes
and refreshes peoples' memories that the fast track is not "in con-
crete" for all time, that it's only available so long as the Senate for
its part and the House for its part are happy with the way things are
going.
The fast track is a very important "pony." We do want trade
agreements authority-but even when we get it, we still have a long
way to go through the course of the negotiations, always with the
5. Merchant Marine (Jones) Act, Pub. L. No. 66-261; 41 Stat. 988 (1920) (codified as
amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 861-889 (1982)).
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fear that someone will resort to the House Rules Committee or the
Senate Rules Committee and try to hobble the fast track.
So that's the pony in the trade bills. How likely is it that we're
going to get it? Well, there's at least a rumor a day on this possibil-
ity. The problem is, even if you are a Pollyanna (which I am), you're
looking at a basically tri-cameral "legislature," consisting of the
House of Representatives, the Senate, and the Trade Conference,
which comprises about 200 members organized into about 17 sub-
conferences. This creates a massive procedural morass that makes it
difficult to achieve the substance that we want out of the process.
Besides, the Congress has other priorities; the Finance and Ways
and Means Committees properly view the budget and the debt ceil-
ing as priorities ahead of trade legislation. So, although I'd like to
play my Pollyanna role and say I think it will all work out, I think
there's substantial risk that it might not. But because there's a pony
in it for us-trade agreements authority and the accompanying fast
track-we are indeed doing our very best to work with not just
Thelma Askey and Joshua Bolten, but the majority as well, to try to
get a bill that the President will sign.
PROFESSOR KOH: We've heard a lot about Thelma Askey and Joshua
Bolten. Thelma Askey, who is our next speaker, is the Minority Counsel for the
House Ways and Means Committee. I should say, putting my teaching cap on,
that through historical accident, or maybe not accident, the principal commit-
tees in the House and Senate to have jurisdiction over trade bills have been the
House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee because
tariff bills were originally for raising revenue and therefore had to originate in
those committees. That means that the legal counsel, minority and majority, for
those two committees have important roles to play. It also means that in the
conference that is now happening, there is a struggle, as we will hear, about
jurisdiction. Josh, the famous Joshua Bolten, is the Minority International
Trade Counsel of the Senate Finance Committee, who will speak this afternoon.
Right now we are lucky to have with us Thelma Askey, who is the Minority
Trade Counsel for the Ways and Means Committee, which means that she is the
principal legal adviser to the Republican members of the House Ways and
Means Committee. She is a graduate of Texas Tech and has also done work at
American University and George Washington, and after a stint on the staff of a
Congressman from Tennessee, has been working for the Ways and Means
Committee.
MS. THELMA ASKEY: I'm rather an interloper here today be-
cause I'm one of the few non-lawyers on the panel of the seminar
this afternoon. However, I've been with the Ways and Means Com-
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mittee for 10 years, so I hope that I can give you a little insight on
how we create manure, and we do plenty of that. Also, I have to
make a correction; I'm a Tennessean, not a Texan.
I also was a little chagrined to find out that I was on the substan-
tive panel rather than the process panel, because at this point in
time, at least in the legislative end of it, we're bogged down in the
process, and the process right now is the substance, and at this time
is at the heart of H.R. 3.6 Although we are in some danger of ad-
dressing substance before we conclude this process of doing a trade
bill, and if we get a public law out of it, we probably are in as great a
danger as we ever have been of making substantive changes in U.S.
trade policy, as well as in the congressional procedures that Judy
Bello already alluded to: fast-track procedures and negotiating
authority.
One of the reasons why we are so focused on the process at this
point, I think, is the inability of the Congress, at least up until recent
days, to address some of the substantive problems that have already
been discussed today that affect our trade policy and affect the trade
deficit, such as getting some control over the federal fiscal budget.
We have had some success in recent days. The House passed the
budget bill; I think that the Senate passed it before they left. But we
still have a long way to go on reconciliation and on the argument
between the President and the Congress over tax increases and de-
fense spending. But at least we seem to have finally made some of
the hard decisions on the budget process, and we won't have to
work, perhaps, on the kind of processes of the trade law in order to
appear to constituents and anyone in the world at large who may be
watching our system to be doing something. We can actually get
down to what we need to do in the substance area.
Another reason why we have been so bogged down in the pro-
cess, as has already been alluded to today, is that there is a tremen-
dous battle going on between the Administration and the Congress
over the balance of power. It's reflected in fast-track procedures,
it's reflected in the discretion that's being argued about in the con-
text of Section 301, Section 201, and a number of our trade laws.
There are going to be, I think, some changes for the future in the
two roles that will be played by the Congress and the Executive and,
indeed, by the third branch of government. I think that if Peter
6. Trade and International Economic Policy Act of 1987, H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. 2, 755-57 (1987).
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Ehrenhaft has his way, we'll have more of a role in determining
trade policy development in our country.
Another reason that we're bogged down in the process is that we
are very much involved in a traditional argument by some of the
self-interested politically strong groups over developing procedures
in such a way that they are weighted in the groups' favor at the end
of the day. There is a tremendous amount of time spent in the nu-
ances of the procedures, and the expectation, I believe, is that there
is success to be had in this exercise because the procedures will
work in your group's favor at the end of the day. And so I do think
that we're still going through a traditional process every time we do
a trade bill, arguing with the various interest groups on how bal-
anced our trade procedures should be and on how balanced they
are.
I think that the fourth reason we're bogged down in the process
right now is the hidden, perhaps not so hidden, political agendas
that naturally exist when we are so close to a presidential election.
It is probably more obvious in the argument over the Gephardt pro-
vision and Gephardt's own stated basis for his campaign, but I think
it is occurring throughout the discussion of the trade bill. Whether
we will have a trade bill hinges in part upon the outcome of this
argument: Whether we want a bill the President will sign, or a bill
the President will veto and which will lead to a fight to override,
which can be exploited for any particular partisan aspects of it, will
depend upon the interest groups whose support may be wanted in
the presidential election and what might be given to them in this
trade bill.
And so we do have a lot of arguments on process that remain to
be addressed before we get to the substantive arguments. There are
obviously substantive arguments there, and I hope that they result
in less of a treatment of the symptoms and more of a treatment of
the causes of our trade deficit. We have tended to get bogged
down, and the Congress has tended to get bogged down, in the
rhetoric of the deficit itself and the relationship of the value of the
dollar to the trade deficit, and what to do about Toshiba, and what
to do about Japan, etc. I do think that with this trade bill we have
been bogged down more than in the past. I think that the evolution
of trade bills since the 1979 Act, 7 indicates that we have been work-
ing at the edges of trade laws without accomplishing much of a pol-
icy shift. A thread that runs through trade acts since the 1979 Act is
7. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144.
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that they're all described as lawyer relief acts. There is an effort to
turn everything over to a quasi-judicial or a judicial process in order
to take the politics out of the process. And one of the goals of the
politicians is to take themselves out of the process and let it be set-
tled in a more legalistic way. In the 1979 Act we went so overboard
in that direction that it became very expensive and difficult to run
through cases. The 1984 Act8 was an effort to reverse some of that
process and give the Administration more discretion and lessen the
ability of petitioners at every step of the procedure to challenge ad-
ministrative decisions in court-to define everything in legalistic
terms as either a dumping or countervailing duty case and therefore
get back to the kind of automatic relief that some of our industries
have desired so strongly.
But we do have before us some substantive policy changes that
will be made, and I think the Gephardt Amendment and Super 301
discussion is one of those: Are we going to move to a symptom-
oriented kind of trade policy that may be politically desirable at this
point in time, or are we going to try to maintain the government's
role as a mediator of a fair policy that all of our U.S. companies can
have a crack at and under which importers as well as domestic pro-
ducers will be treated similarly?
The second substantive argument I have already alluded to and
that is the fight between Congress and the Administration over dis-
cretion. Another substantive issue is reflected in the kind of plant-
closing legislation that we are facing. It is a recognition, I think, of
the adjustment that we need to have in our society because of the
change in the trade basis. But, that plant-closing policy also raises
the serious policy question of whether the government is going to
be responsible for mediating between labor and management and
whether plants are closed or move overseas. We are getting pretty
close to what we have criticized the Japanese for doing, and that is
picking winners and losers. I am not so sure the government is the
best instrument to do that.
I would like to make two points before I conclude, and I hope that
they can be discussed again in the question period. I think a lot of
the members of the Ways and Means Committee, especially the Re-
publican members, would caution the Administration not to make a
pony out of negotiating authority when it really is a donkey or
worse. Congress has carved up the negotiating authority to such a
8. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad-
min. News (98 Stat.) 2948.
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degree that I am afraid that it is not going to be worth what the
Administration hopes it will be worth in the final analysis. The Ad-
ministration should be very careful about desiring this fast-track
procedure so strongly and desiring this negotiating-authority proce-
dure that has worked so well in the past. They may find out that
what they get is not something that worked as well as it did in the
past, but something that would just be a real problem for them and
the Congress. But I do think this issue reflects the changing dichot-
omy between the Congress and the Administration, and that we are
not going to be able to escape it, and we will just have to deal with
this as we go through the next few Congresses.
I will close by referring again to the dual standard that we have
discussed on a number of occasions and just two points that I would
like to make. I think our Puritan ancestors would roll over in their
graves at the suggestion that success is based on working less hard.
We certainly are not suggesting to ourselves that we need to work
less hard, and I think that it is a real mistake to seek a solution in
other countries that requires working less hard. I will repeat a story
that Congressman Bill Frenzel, who was going to be with you today
but could not be, has stated, and that is: What we are going through
now as we worry about a "level playing field" and our relationship
to foreigners with respect to trade policies and as we criticize for-
eign countries for providing a locale with low-wage, nonunion, low-
tax incentives for production, is not so unlike the domestic argu-
ment we went through when the South was attracting businesses
from the North by offering low-wage, nonunion, low-tax, govern-
ment assistance locales for businesses.
PROFESSOR KOH: Again, if I can provide some vocabulary for people
who are coming to the trade field for the first time, we have gotten some history
from Gary Horlick on the statutory enactments in this field. The principal
enactments have been the 1974 Act, which was sort of the progenitor of the
fast-track procedure; the 1979 Act, which implemented the Tokyo Round;9 the
1984 Act; and now the proposed 1987 Act. The various numbers that you
hear us throwing around-201, 301, 337-are not numbers plucked out of
the air like R2-D2 or C-3PO; they are provisions of the 1974 Act as they
have been embellished. This helps us to understand why our next speaker has so
much experience in the field. Richard Rivers is a graduate of Tulane Univer-
sity, the University of Texas, and Catholic University Law School. He was
then International Trade Counsel to the Senate Finance Committee during the
negotiation for the enactment of the 1974 Act and then was the Special Trade
9. See Glossary at 130.
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Representative's General Counsel, the same office which Judy Bello is now the
Deputy General Counsel, during the Tokyo Round, where he participated in the
passage of 1979 Act. He is now a partner at the law firm Akin, Gump,
Strauss, Hauer & Feld in Washington, D.C. He is also the General Counsel
of the Coalition of Service Industries which, as we have seen, has a great inter-
est both in the Trade Act and in the new Uruguay Round.
MR. RICHARD RIVERS: Thank you very much. You have heard
quite a lot this morning about these laws: the antidumping law and
the countervailing duty law, the escape clause, and Section 337. I
do not believe that there is much I can add to the commentary on
those specific provisions by my distinguished colleagues on this
panel and the preceding panel. I would like, however, to talk about
these laws in a slightly different context and in a broader
perspective.
To begin with, I would like to pose a question to Judy Bello, who
told the story concerning the boy and the pony. The question is,
"How did that manure get into the national living room?" It is a
problem in cosmology, Judy; where did it come from? How did we
get into this situation that we are in now? Seven years ago, Gary
Horlick and I were invited to serve on a panel for the Practicing Law
Institute held at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C. I joined
Gary at his office, and we walked to the Mayflower Hotel. I walked
into that hotel anticipating a small room with perhaps a dozen
young lawyers and that we would discuss the antidumping law. In-
stead, we walked into the ballroom of the Mayflower Hotel, and
there were 400 lawyers with their sleeves rolled up and their yellow
pads out. I turned to Gary and said, "There is no way the antidump-
ing law of the United States can support all of these lawyers. If it
ever appeared to be a threat, we would have to stop it in the interest
of the United States." "Well," Gary replied, "don't be so sure."
And do you know what? I was wrong and Gary was right, because
all of those lawyers are currently working in Washington on any
number of trade cases. We simply had not anticipated the tremen-
dous proliferation of trade cases. In 1981 we had not expected
many things. We had not seen the galleys for David Stockman's
book, the tax bill, or defense appropriations and spending. We had
not anticipated the largest budget deficits in human history or the
perverse effect that it was going to have on the world economy and
on the external accounts of the United States. It is this perspective
that I think we should consider as we talk about import competition.
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My law partner, Bob Strauss, often tells the story that whenever
he reported to Lyndon Johnson that he was in control of the situa-
tion, Johnson would reply with a story about two ants (I will not tell
you what kind of ants LBJ said they were) on a log in the Colorado
River. Both of these ants thought that they were controlling events
by guiding that log through the rapids. I suspect the same thing is
occurring with regard to our international trade. We are not in con-
trol of our affairs. We have pursued macroeconomic policies that
have grossly distorted our economy and have contributed to a dise-
quilibrium in the world economy which is unprecedented since the
1930s. It is alarming that we are riding a log through these rapids,
but we are hardly steering it.
I submit to you that the antidumping and countervailing duty laws
are not going to solve these problems. What we need to be doing is,
as the name of this panel indicates, controlling imports and opening
access to foreign markets. It is not, however, Section 301 nor the
antidumping law that is going to help us. In the final analysis, it will
be intelligent macroeconomic policies. This is the reason why, in
my view, we have found all of this manure in the national living
room. It also explains why Congress, as my colleague here noted,
really does not want to get into the business of regulating imports,
because these laws were enacted by Congress to take Congress out
of import regulation. Congress no longer wanted to deal with the
interests of individual producers who were appealing for protection
from foreign competition. As a result, we have overloaded the sys-
tem, which explains why we have had enormous cases regarding sev-
eral gloriously dramatic products: wine, Japanese semiconductors,
automobiles, and softwood lumber. For those who think that this
field is full of drama and glory, I have some additional citations of
other, less glamorous cases, such as plastic mattress handles from
Taiwan, or pregnant mares, urine from Canada. These are two
landmark cases in the annals of American trade law.
In any event, I submit to you that current remedies, even for deal-
ing with the micro problems, are imperfect. I am not sure that they
always serve the national interest. They sometimes serve the inter-
ests of particular producers and, I will be candid enough to say, I
frequently represent those producers.
One example illustrating my point that the current trade remedies
are imperfect is the semiconductor case, a case in which I continue
to be involved. My client is a foreign producer of semiconductors. I
am not sure that the antidumping law is an effective statute for deal-
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ing with a complex problem involving an intricate industry operat-
ing in a global marketplace, in which the product can be carted
around in a suitcase. Technology is advancing so rapidly that mas-
sive expenditures of research and development are required in or-
der to maintain the ability to sell a product in next month's
marketplace. During the semiconductor cases, I often had the feel-
ing that we were using a law that was really more suited for dealing
with something like cast-iron manhole covers from India than for
dealing with a 21st century industry and a 21st century global eco-
nomic problem. I do not believe that this is the way in which we
ought to be making our national policies. These problems have
their roots in global economic policies and in foreign industrial poli-
cies. It does not always follow that the statutes about which we have
been talking this morning are particularly effective for dealing with
those problems. No one, however, has come up with any better
ideas.
I do not have any easy solutions to these problems, but I do think
we need some type of Hippocratic oath in U.S. trade policy which
has as its premise, first and foremost, that we will not make the pa-
tient any worse off. The current laws are not likely to be repealed,
and will remain part of our permanent political landscape. We need
to view them, however, in the proper context and understand that
they are not and can never be a substitute for intelligent national
policies.
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Panel II: Questions & Answers
AUDIENCE MEMEBER: I am a law clerk from the Court of In-
ternational Trade, and an L.L.M. student at New York University
Law School. I have a question for Mr. Rivers, although he is wel-
come to tip the ball to anyone else on the panel if he chooses. Tak-
ing your premise that what the United States needs is not
antidumping and countervailing duty laws, but intelligent
macroeconomic policy, I wonder if you could address the cumula-
tion provisions and how trade imbalances will get better when we
are taking actions against really de minimis dumping?
MR. RIVERS: I'll try to explain the background of the question,
and I invite my colleagues to address what is in the present bill to a
much greater extent. In order to obtain a final antidumping order,
or in most instances a final countervailing duty order, one must
prove injury by reason of the dumped or subsidized imports. This
oftentimes involves trade from multiple countries. Congress
amended the law because prior to that the ITC's practice was to
require that basically you had to prove material injury in the case of
imports from each of the export-producing countries disaggregated.
Several years ago, Congress amended the law basically to require
that the ITC "cumulate," that is, one could prove material injury by
reason of the cumulated injury from several countries, any one of
which might not, by itself, rise to the standard of material injury, but
in the aggregate were sort of like piranha bites: One piranha
doesn't kill you, but seven might. That's an example of congres-
sional tinkering with the trade laws. They all have to be found to be
dumping. It has become a very controversial provision because it
provides an incentive for petitioners to add countries; you name
many respondents in order to have the maximum case to make to
the ITC that you have injury. I might add that as I understand it
(and it doesn't surprise me), this is a point of some consternation
and disagreement in the current U.S.-Canadian negotiations, be-
cause the Canadians are of the view that they are regularly named in
cases where they ought not be named.
I assume what is in the current law moves even further in that
direction. I turn it over to Judy Bello to explain further refinement
in that direction.
MS. BELLO: There has been refinement, and fortunately so, be-
cause it is of great concern to us and in particular to foreign govern-
ments from whom we hear regularly. There is a provision, I believe
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in the House bill, that allows a "carve-out" where imports are con-
sidered to have a negligible contribution. So there is at least some
discretion in the House bill, but the Senate provision (Josh Bolten
can correct me if he recalls better) does make it more draconian
than it currently is.
MR. HORLICK: I think cumulation is a good example of the two
problems here. The first, the statutory one that Dick and Judy men-
tioned, of de minimis dumping. The reason why is simple competi-
tive behavior. Using the piranha example, the domestic producer of
widgets would have to spend another $20,000 on lawyer fees to toss
in five more goldfish. Each of those goldfish will have to spend
$100,000 defending itself. This is use of the judicial process, the
transaction cost-which the U.S. judicial process usually ignores-
for harassment.
The second problem is a good example of how in the administra-
tive process these laws can become a substantive fact in themselves.
The cumulation statute provides that the ITC has to find they are
both being sold there and they have to find they are both compet-
ing. So the logic is fine. The ITC has to find that the piranhas are
actually biting the same industry. But, in administrative terms-and
anyone is welcome to correct me-the ITC tends to be very mechan-
ical about that, because administering agencies (I used to work for
one) fall back on mechanical devices. So what they look at is
whether there are imports from the two different countries in the
same place at the same time. But that is not what a competition law-
yer would look at (correct me if I am wrong) to determine whether
they are really competing with each other. The ITC just looks
mechanically, i.e., were they imported in the same area of the coun-
try at the same time? They could be serving very different markets.
I am not criticizing the ITC for that. It is a good example of how
when Congress passes a statute it doesn't always anticipate how it
will have to be administered.
MS. BELLO: I might add that, if you go back and look at the
legislative history of the particular margin provisions, I think this is
an example of what I was referring to earlier. The goal was more a
political one. It was an effort by particular industries, in this case
the textile industry, to weight the calculations and weight the proce-
dures to their advantage. There wasn't much thought given,
although there was a lot of discussion at that time, to de minimis
measurement. When the decision came to be made, it was "try to
make that cumulation provision as strict as possible" so that the ITC
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would not have much discretion and neither would the
Administration.
MS. ASKEY: At the beginning of a case, of course, the ITC
makes its preliminary finding before there is any finding by the
Commerce Department about whether any of the merchandise con-
cerned has been sold at less than fair value. So, in the beginning the
margins are just assumed and, of course, an affirmative ITC prelimi-
nary determination is a basis for suspension. So, there is a draco-
nian trade effect that can occur even in cases where it is not at all
warranted, because only the piranha has dumped; maybe the gold-
fish are completely innocent.
MR. APPLEBAUM: If you look within the perspective of the an-
tidumping law itself, why weren't the semiconductor cases among
the most successful for domestic petitioners? In the 64KD RAM
case, the domestic industry prevailed and obtained large dumping
margins, and in the 256KD RAM case, the domestic industry was on
its way to prevailing in a similar fashion. This caused the pressure
that brought about the agreement, and even if you look at the way
the agreement is administered, the Commerce Department is still
applying antidumping principles in monitoring whether or not the
Japanese semiconductor companies are selling at prices within their
agreement. If you accept the premise of the antidumping law, isn't
the semiconductor agreement one that did succeed within the per-
spective of what the antidumping laws hoped to achieve? One could
criticize the agreement, as I did, but for other reasons, potentially as
to what it did in terms of arguably "cartelizing" the market. But, it
is certainly a major achievement; in many respects it is grounded on
antidumping proceedings.
MR. HORLICK: I believe five or ten years from now the people
thtt brought those cases are going to recognize that it really didn't
serve their long-term strategic interests. That's something I feel in
my gut. The problems that afflict the U.S. semiconductor industry-
and they are many-are not simply categorizable, if you will permit
me, or attributable, to their trade problems. I think anybody in the
industry-and there is someone here sitting in the middle of this
classroom from Texas Instruments, who is far more knowledgeable
than I about the industry-would say this industry has got problems
for a variety of reasons. They are not all offshore, they are not all
attributable to foreign market access, third-country dumping, or
dumping of chips in the United States.
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The people who make chips abroad tend to be vertically inte-
grated, for example. They don't tend to be chip manufacturers.
They tend to be computer manufacturers who make chips in order
to make computers. The people in the United States that have had
the most difficulty in this cyclical industry are the people who tend
to be merchant chip manufacturers who don't make computers; they
sell them in the marketplace. I think the antidumping law for some
of these producers provided short-term relief and maybe will allow
them to get out of a losing business at a higher price than they
might otherwise have gotten out, or maybe allow them to sustain
their operations in the United States for a little longer time than was
previously permitted. But it's a palliative; it's not a long-term solu-
tion to the problems that afflict the industry. So I really believe that
10 years from now there are going to be some producers who will
rue the day they filed those cases and set up the elaborate system
that is now in place.
But there is no question that the antidumping law serves some-
one's interest or it wouldn't be there. I assume if it served no one's
interest we would have repealed it by now, but as for serving a na-
tional interest, I have grave doubts. It was in that perspective that I
was saying that I don't think that the application of the antidumping
law was particularly good in that semiconductor case. It provided a
weapon, it provided a club with which the U.S. Government could
basically throttle the Japanese government and the Japanese produ-
cers to do things they wanted them to do. But I am not sure it is in
the national interest. We now have a high price island of semicon-
ductors. It's another example; it's not too much different from the
mandatory oil import program. We have a price for semiconductors
in the United States; there is a world price that's lower. We are
moving systems manufacturers offshore. I am not sure that's in the
national interest.
MR. EHRENHAFr: I have the luxury of having been conflicted
out of the semiconductor case, which is surprisingly frequent in
these complex cases involving multinationals. I think it raises two
questions: First, was it effective for the semiconductor producers in
getting relief? The answer is yes. The danger here, though, is that
this case was not done as a dumping case; this was done as a fit of
national hysteria that semiconductors were crucial to our national
security. I am not going to argue the point one way or another.
Suffice it to say that the Administration treated this, as Mike Stein
pointed out-I believe he was involved in the cases also-as "We're
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going to make this industry work! And we are going to sit down and
do it!" Now, the dumping law, whatever else you want to say about
it, sure wasn't done to take care of national security concerns.
So there was a dumping calculation done in the midst of a negoti-
ation with Japan about third country prices and the Japanese market
situation, and a decision that this is essential to the national security.
There are arguments that the dumping margins were higher than
they otherwise would have been because of that. The problem is
that once you decide on how you allocate R&D in a semiconductor
dumping case, in order to make sure you get high margins, so you
can force a deal on the Japanese, you establish precedents. I frankly
didn't care-as I said I was conflicted out-but I was involved in an
orange juice case and the exact same rules were then going to be
applied to orange juice, because that's the way the U.S. legalistic
system works. We are into precedents with the same principles on
allocation. We were watching semiconductors very closely because
we were worried about orange juice. I might add that this was im-
ported orange juice from a well-known U.S. company, a big U.S.
multinational, to show you how crossed these are. So, first of all, is
it effective as a dumping case? Yes, but when you start doing it as
more than a dumping case, when you start doing it to protect an
important U.S. industry, you are setting precedents for future
dumping cases.
The second question goes to the mechanism for using a dumping
law to help an important U.S. industry, semiconductors. My criti-
cism of it is very simple: It was all secret. There is no one in this
room except Mike Stein, Judy Bello, maybe Harvey Applebaum and
maybe Dick Rivers, who were privy to all that was going on. An
important policy setting up a worldwide cartel (because that is what
it is on chips) was formulated in the dark. If the U.S. antidumping
laws have one thing in their favor, it is transparency. So, it was done
in the dark. Show me the 20% on paper, Mike. Now there is liter-
ally a worldwide cartel on chips, whether that is good or bad; but
there is a shortage, according at least to the client who conflicted me
out of this case, of 1 DRAM chips as a result. Because the U.S., in
order to really make this agreement work, finally had to order Japan
to reduce production.
To put that in an economic context for a second, the gains in pro-
ductivity in semiconductors are huge. When you start having gov-
ernment mess around in trade (I am not taking a position on
whether the Japanese government or the U.S. government was more
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involved in the trade), you are affecting enormous gains in produc-
tivity, which in theory is what the free market trading system is all
about.
PROFESSOR KOH: I would like to exercise my prerogative
again and to close this morning's session by asking one question at a
higher level of generality to all the panelists. What we seem to be
getting out of this morning is that we have an extraordinary range of
extremely talented and articulate and experienced practitioners and
Congresspersons who are totally unable to deal with this problem.
What strikes me as odd is that we are talking about the very same
committees who last year sat down and said, "Okay, we are going to
do tax simplification." Whether they succeeded or not, is a question
which could be independently debated. The question that I have is,
if there is such universal agreement about the need for simplifica-
tion, why is simplification the one thing that is not going to emerge
from this trade bill?
MS. BELLO: I don't think simplification was one of the goals to
begin with. However, I do think we may achieve some simplification
in the process. I think we are still on the trend that began in 1984 of
having less litigation in the process, and fewer legal challenges until
the end of the process. In spite of the argument with the Adminis-
tration on presidential discretion, there are several areas of the bill
that provide general discretion to the agencies, so that they can
make policy decisions on some of the cases without being chal-
lenged every step of the way. So, we may achieve some simplifica-
tion by accident. But I don't think that was the goal of the bill. It
certainly was a political goal when it began two years ago, and only
this year became a goal that we would actually like to reach in the
form of some policy changes. But I think simplification was never
very high on the agenda and it got lost in the process.
MS. ASKEY: I think the short answer is that if you are in Con-
gress you score points and get votes not when you keep markets
open but when you do something for constituents. The usual prob-
lem in sustaining the consensus for freer trade (there being no such
thing as free trade) is that the support for free trade is quite diverse.
But the support for special interest protection is quite concentrated,
vocal, and very loud in the Congress. So, you always fight in the
Administration and in the Congress the uphill battle against the
types of provisions which are designed basically to ensure protec-
tionist results for special interests. It is an uphill battle because
someone who loses a job in Texas is much more concerned than I
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am if I pay $.50 more for a shirt. It matters more to the job-loser
because it's his whole job, it's his mortgage, it's his future, whereas
for me, I gripe if I pay $.50 more for a shirt, but it obviously doesn't
have much impact on me. So I don't stand up as much to yell for
freer trade as the guy in Texas who is out of work yells for some
form of protection.
MR. RIVERS: I think it gets almost more mechanical. Special in-
terest trade legislation is no different than special interest tax legis-
lation; the tax code was certainly a monument to it. How come
Congress can simplify it? The answer is that every American sit3
down once a year and recognizes what a mess the tax code is, so it
was politically saleable to do that. If you put a label on every im-
ported good saying how much more expensive it was to buy that
blouse than if there hadn't been a multifiber arrangement (MFA),I0
which we haven't discussed, you'd get rid of the MFA in a day. But
no one knows it. Whereas the tax laws forced you to confront it.
That is the difference in a nutshell.
MR. HORLICK: Trade legislation in my view is an exercise in
political self-immunization. You vote for a trade bill, you sponsor
an amendment for your constituent, you've done it and now they
can't be heard to complain about it at the polling booth at the next
election day. The result of this year's trade exercise is likely to be
quite simple; it is likely to be a presidential veto, I think, and proba-
bly no bill at all. It's a good possibility.
PROFESSOR KOH: Well, that brings us to the relationship be-
tween the President and Congress.
10. Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25
U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840. The MFA is an international compact that allows con-
tracting parties to apply quantitative restrictions on textile imports when the importing
country considers them necessary to prevent market disruption-restrictions that would
otherwise be contrary to GATT provisions. See United States Trade Representative, Ex-
ecutive Office of the President, A Preface to Trade (1982).
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